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KAUFMAN

PUNISHING VICTIM AS PERPETRATOR: IN RE: S.K. AND
THE CHILLING EFFECT OF LABELING TEEN SEXTING AS
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
BY EMMA KAUFMAN*
In their 2019 decision, In re S.K.1, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed two issues: whether it is possible to convict a minor for
the distribution of child pornography, and whether it is possible to convict a minor for the display of obscene material when the minor is a
consensual party participating in the documented sexual activity.2 On
the distribution issue, the Court held that there was no exception for
minors within the Maryland child pornography criminal statute, and
therefore, minors can be adjudicated as delinquent as distributors of
child pornography.3 As for the obscene materials issue, the Court held
that cellphone videos qualified as one of the “items” enumerated by the
Maryland child pornography statute and S.K.’s conduct fell within the
purview of the statute, thus violating its provisions.4
However, the Court’s decision was incorrect in three major capacities: the holding failed to advance the legislative intent underlying
the child pornography statute5 the decision takes too broad a view in
characterizing a text message video as one of the “items” enumerated
by the applicable statute6, and the decision neglected to use a constitutional analysis to reconcile the technological realities of voluntary sexting7 with the antiquated child pornography statute.8
Part I of this article will outline the circumstances that resulted
in criminal charges being filed against S.K., and the decisions of the trial
and appellate courts thereafter.9 Part II will discuss the case’s legal his-
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461 Md. 31 (2019).
2
Id. at 36.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See infra Part IV-A.
6
See infra Part IV-B.
7
See infra Part IV-C; see also Sexting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The creation, possession, or distribution of sexually explicit images via cellphones”).
8
See infra Part IV-C.
9
See infra Part I.
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tory, including foundational Supreme Court cases addressing child pornography, the legislative effort to combat child pornography at the national and state level, research on sexting among minors, and the attempts of various states to reconcile consensual sexting among minors
with child pornography legislation.10 Part III will explore the Court of
Appeals ’reasoning in deciding S.K.’s case, ultimately leading the Court
to adjudicate S.K. as delinquent for her involvement in the distribution
of child pornography, as well as in the display of an obscene item to a
minor.11 Part IV analyzes the Court’s decision in In re S.K., examining
the Court’s adherence to the legislative intent behind the child pornography statute, as well as the Court’s characterization of a texted video
as a “film”, concluding with a discussion of the implications of categorizing consensual sexting among minors as child pornography.12
I.

THE CASE

From 2016 to 2017, a trio of friends attending Maurice J.
McDonough High School in Charles County, Maryland, used their cellphones to send each other photos and videos in a group chat. 13 The
friend group was comprised of A.T., a sixteen-year-old female, K.S., a
seventeen-year-old male, and S.K., a sixteen-year-old female. 14 The
group chat communications were occasionally used as a sort of “oneup” competition, where the videos and photos sent by one friend were
intended to impress or shock the other friends in some way.15 In accordance with the group chat dynamic, S.K. sent K.S. and A.T. a one-minute
video in which S.K performed fellatio on an unidentified male.16 The
male appeared to be filming the video with his arm extended, during
which the male’s upper torso and erect penis were visible, and S.K.’s
nude upper body and breast were exposed.17 Unfortunately, there was a
conflict between S.K. and K.S. in December of 2016, after which K.S.
persuaded A.T. to accompany him in reporting S.K.’s video to the
school resources officer, a uniformed police officer assigned to the
school.18 A.T. later testified that during this time period, K.S. bragged
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
In re S.K., 466 Md. 31, 36 (2019).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
In re S.K., 466 Md. at 37.
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to his peers that he would be able to send S.K. to jail if he showed the
texted video to the school administration.19
A.T. and K.S. brought the video to the attention of the school
resource officer, Mr. Eugene Caballero, an of the Charles County Sheriff’s Office.20 Following the meeting, Officer Caballero met with S.K.,
who provided the officer with a written statement declaring that she was
in the video and she had only sent it to K.S. and A.T.21 According to the
officer’s police report, S.K. agreed to speak with Officer Caballero after
she was read her Miranda rights.22 Additionally, S.K. believed that the
purpose of the meeting was to stop the video being from being distributed further at the school and was not informed that she was suspected
of criminal activity. 23 Officer Caballero submitted his report to the
State’s Attorney for Charles County, which used its discretion to file
criminal charges against S.K. on three counts.24 Count 1 charged S.K.
with violating CR § 11-207(a)(2)25 for filming a minor engaged in sexual conduct, Count 2 charged S.K. with violating CR § 11-207(a)(4)26
for distributing child pornography, and Count 3 charged S.K. with violating CR § 11-203(b)(1)(ii)27 for displaying obscene materials to a minor.28
At the April 27, 2017, adjudicatory hearing before the Circuit
Court of Charles County, the juvenile court dismissed Count 1, finding
that there was no evidence to support the contention that S.K. filmed the
video at issue.29 The court held that S.K. was involved regarding Counts
2 and 3, and subsequently placed S.K. on electronic monitoring and supervised probation between May 18, 2017, and June 9, 2017.30 During

19

Id.
Id.
21
Id. at 38.
22
Id.
23
In re S.K., 466 Md. at 38.
24
Id.
25
Id.; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-207(a)(2) (2019) (“A person may not . . . photograph
or film a minor engaging in an obscene act, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual conduct”).
26
In re S.K., 466 Md. at 38; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-207(a)(4) (2019) (“A person
may not . . . knowingly promote, advertise, solicit, distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute any matter, visual representation, or performance. . . .”).
27
In re S.K., 466 Md. at 38; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-203(b)(1)(ii) (2019) (“A person
may not willfully or knowingly display or exhibit to a minor an item . . . that consists of an
obscene picture of a nude or partially nude figure”).
28
In re S.K. 466 Md. at 38.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 38–39.
20
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this period, S.K. was required to report to a Department of Juvenile Services probation officer, obtain permission prior to moving or leaving
Maryland, allow the probation officer to enter her home, complete a
weekly drug test, attend and complete an anger management course, and
complete a substance abuse assessment.31 After S.K. completed her probation requirements on September 27, 2018, and her case was ordered
closed and sealed, S.K. appealed the juvenile court’s delinquency finding to the Court of Special Appeals.32
On Count 1, the Court of Special Appeals held that Maryland’s
child pornography statute, CR § 11-207, does not exempt minors from
its purview, and therefore, S.K. was in violation of the statute.33 On
Count 2, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court and held that
the video that S.K. sent to K.S. and A.T. did not qualify as an “item” as
enumerated by CR § 11-20334, and therefore, S.K. was not involved as
to the second criminal charge.35 Following the Court of Special Appeals
decision, both the state and S.K. filed petitions for writs of certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, which the Court granted on October 9,
2018.36 The Court agreed with the intermediate appellate court’s analysis of the first criminal charge, but the Court disagreed with the intermediate court on the second charge, and found that the video S.K. texted
to K.S. and A.T. fell within CR § 11-203’s definition of “item”—specifically, the video qualified as a “film,” one of the types of media enumerated by the statute.37 As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the
Court of Special Appeals, finding that S.K. was involved as to both
criminal charges.38
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act in 1978 in response to increasing concerns among American citizens and their elected representatives about the exploitation of
31

Id. at 39.
Id.
33
In re S.K., 466 Md. at 39–40 (citing In re S.K., 237 Md. App. 458, 473 (2018)).
34
In re S.K., 466 Md. at 40; See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-203(a)(4)(2006) (“Sale or
display of obscene item to minor . . . (4)’Item ’means a: (i) still picture or photograph; (ii) book,
pocket book, pamphlet or magazine; (iii) videodisc, videotape, video game, film, or computer
disc; or (iv) recorded telephone message”).
35
In re S.K. 466 Md. at 40.
36
Id. at 41.
37
Id.
38
Id.
32
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minors in the production and distribution of child pornography as well
as through child prostitution.39 The main goal of the legislation was to
prevent the recruitment of vulnerable children for the purposes of child
pornography and prostitution.40 The Senate report accompanying the act
stated that the children recruited were “frequently [the] victims of child
abuse, or of broken homes, or of parents who simply do not care,” and
that the exploitation of the children resulted in a “deep psychological,
humiliating impact” on the children, and thus jeopardizing “the possibility of healthy, affectionate relationships in the future.”41 However,
cultural shifts regarding sexuality, the explosion of constant cellphone
use, as well as the manner in which those seismic societal changes have
impacted communication, complicate the act’s original mandate.42 As a
result, courts across the country are now deciding whether to adjudicate
minors for voluntarily sending explicit images of themselves under the
applicable child pornography statute, if that statute contains no exception for minors.43
Part II.A of this note traces the foundational cases that created
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence governing child pornography.44 Part
II.B tracks the evolution of child pornography legislation at the national
level. 45 Part II.C provides an overview of the development of Maryland’s laws related to child pornography.46 Part II.D delves into the increasingly common practice of sexting among minors.47 Finally, Part
II.E outlines several states ’approaches to the issue of combating child
pornography in a world where teen sexting is common and where Maryland stands in relation to those approaches.48
A. Understanding Child Pornography: Foundational Case Law
Modern understandings of what legally qualifies as “obscene”
can be traced back to the 1973 case Miller v. California49, where the
39

See S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 3–4 (1977).
See id. at 8–11.
41
Id.
42
See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary,
15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 506–07 (2008).
43
See id. at 514–15.
44
See infra Part II-A.
45
See infra Part II-B.
46
See infra Part II-C.
47
See infra Part II-D.
48
See infra Part II-E.
49
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
40
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Supreme Court provided a new test under which the producers of certain
materials would be criminalized for violating federal obscenity laws.50
The Court declared that materials would be declared obscene if those
materials “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as
a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”51 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger referenced the
purpose of the First Amendment in his opinion, stating that the amendment protected speech and press that were aimed at furthering the exchange of ideas that facilitated valuable political and social shifts. 52
These shifts were desired by the American people, and, unlike explicit
sexual images, would advance the nation towards a more enlightened
future.53
In the 1982 case New York v. Ferber54, the Supreme Court expanded its Miller framework to criminalize child pornography, declaring that child pornography was included within the umbrella concept of
“obscene material,” but that a different test must be used.55 Writing for
the majority, Justice White stated that the Miller test required adjustment for determining whether obscene materials qualified as child pornography.56 The Ferber Court held that the “trier of fact need not find
that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it
is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently
offensive manner, and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole.”57 In defining child pornography, the Court stated that prohibited
depictions included materials featuring minors engaged in “actual or
simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the
genitals.” 58 The Court concluded that child pornography was a sufficiently distinct category of obscene material that was not afforded First
Amendment protections. 59 Additionally, the State’s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors is “compelling,” and thus, states must be given greater deference in how they
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 16, 34–35.
Id. at 34–35.
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Id. at 764.
Id. at 749, 764.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 765.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
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regulate child pornography as compared to how they regulate pornographic material featuring adults.60
B. Child Pornography Legislation: National Origins
The prohibition of the display or distribution of obscene material, especially the exposure of minors to such material, has long been
the subject of state and federal legislation.61 However, in 1977, Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act
to fill in the gaps of existing federal obscenity statutes.62 The Act was
designed to amend Title 18 of the United States Code, which made it
illegal to produce materials, including “any film, photograph, negative,
slide, book, or magazine” in which minors were engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.63 The Act featured language that included the prohibition of sexual exploitation of children, as well as coercion or enticement
of a minor into prostitution.64
Congress believed that the existing federal legislation neglected
to protect some of the most vulnerable minors within the United States
and this oversight resulted in the sexual exploitation of those minors,
resulting in those minors being forced into prostitution or child pornography.65 The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report that accompanied the
legislation noted that “federal authorities initiated pornography investigations only if the case involved a large manufacturer or distributor or
if the case involved a connection with organized crime. Thus, many of
the sources of child pornography never came within the purview of federal investigators.”66 The report further stated that there was no federal
legislation that expressly prohibited the manner in which children were
exploited to produce child pornography and the need for such federal
laws was underscored by the lack of state laws banning the use of children to create pornography.67
Ultimately, the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act attempted to prevent the use of children in the production of
pornographic materials in three major capacities: first, by criminalizing
the creation of pornography portraying children in an obscene manner
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 756–58.
Outmezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 159 (1993).
See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 9–10 (1977).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9–10.
See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 10 (1977).
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as a new category of child abuse; second, by expanding legislation prohibiting the interstate trafficking of minors to include male minors; and
third, by “go[ing] as far as constitutionally possible to ban the sale and
distribution of child pornography.”68 Congress hoped that the passage
of the Act would arm prosecutors with a more robust assortment of tools
with which they could protect children and punish those who abuse
them.69
C. The State Follows Suit: The Development of Maryland’s Child
Pornography Law
In 1978, the Maryland General Assembly (General Assembly)
enacted the state’s first law regulating child pornography; the law was
part of the larger national trend of legislation aimed at fighting child
pornography production.70 The Maryland law made it illegal to cause,
force, or knowingly permit a minor under the age of 16 to be featured in
pornographic material.71 Additionally, the law criminalized the act of
either filming or photographing a minor who was engaged in obscene
activity. 72 In the bill file accompanying the statute, testimony from
stakeholders such as members of the National Conference of State Legislatures and State Attorney General’s Office explained that the purpose
of the state law was to complement the federal child pornography statute
and incarcerate predators involved in the production and distribution of
child pornography.73
Over the years, the General Assembly strengthened the child
pornography statute—in 1985, the state legislature broadened the existing law to include a provision that made it illegal to “knowingly distribute, promote, or possess with intent to distribute materials” depicting a
minor “engaged as a subject in sexual conduct,” conduct that may or
may not qualify as “obscene.”74 The legislature amended the Maryland
child pornography statute again in 1986 to include a prohibition on photographing minors under 16 years of age who were engaged in sexual

68

Id. at 18.
Id.
70
See Leighton Aiken, The Legal Ramifications of Child Pornography in Maryland, 10 U.
BALT. L. FORUM. 27, 28 (1980); see also MD. CODE. ANN. art. 27, § 419A (1978) (current version
at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-207 (2019)).
71
See art. 27, § 419A (current version at CRIM. LAW § 11-207).
72
See id.
73
See Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 461 (2005).
74
Outmezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 164 (1993).
69

KAUFMAN

120

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 20:1

activity.75 The General Assembly increased the age of who qualified as
a “minor” to 18 in 1989.76 The legislature expanded the list of what
could qualify as a prohibited “item” containing child pornography in
1995, where the statute was revised to include “film” and “computer
disc,”77 and later, in 2006, to include “video games.”78
In 2019, the General Assembly passed a law that amended the
definition of “sexual conduct” to include “lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of any person” and expanded what qualified as
child pornography possession, making possession of computer-generated images of minors under the age of sixteen “that are indistinguishable from an actual child” illegal.79 The intention behind these expansions and revisions was clear—by broadening the legal definition of
“minor” and “sexual conduct”, as well as types of conduct criminalized
by the child pornography statute, the General Assembly was attempting
to make it easier for prosecutors to put predators who were engaged in
the production and distribution of child pornography in prison.80
However, Maryland’s child pornography law contains no exception for minors who produce and distribute material featuring minors
engaged in sexual activity.81 In 2019, Delegate C.T. Wilson introduced
legislation in response to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals ’opinion on S.K.’s case.82 In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Delegate Wilson stated that while minors engaged in sexting
could be described as involved in “voluntary self-exploitation,” those
minors have brains that are still developing, with “prefrontal cortexes
that are definitely not evolved to the point where they understand problem-solving, impulse control, weighing options…”, and it is unjust to
75

See 1986 Md. Laws 602.
1989 Md. Laws 2797.
77
1989 Md. Laws 1798.
78
2006 Md. Laws 1822.
79
H.B.1027, 2019 Leg., 440th Sess. (Md. 2019).
80
See H.B. 1027, 2019 Leg., 440th Sess. (Md. 2019) (statement of Del. Lesley Lopez),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Committees/Media/false?cmte=jud&ys=2019RS&clip=JUD_3_6_2019_meeting_1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmgahouse.maryland.gov%2Fmga%2Fplay%2F8cf4e781-75364f0c-ba8d-d42731d1efd5%2F%3Fcatalog%2F03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da93ff74bdaa4c%26playfrom%3D4424000 (explaining that the purpose of H.B. 1027 was to
“strengthen current child porn laws by elevating them to the federal standard,” thus empowering
state law enforcement “to go after those who might otherwise slip through the cracks”).
81
In re S.K., 466 Md. 31, 57 (2019) (stating that the plain meaning of the Maryland
child pornography statute does not distinguish between whether an adult or a minor is
distributing the material at issue).
82
Id. at 57–58 n. 24.
76
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subject those minors to the same harsh punishments as adults.83 While
Delegate Wilson’s bill did not pass during the 2019 legislative session,
Delegate Wilson and several of his fellow legislators proposed new bills
during the 2020 legislative session that would exempt minors from the
child pornography statute, under specific conditions. 84 Despite the legislators’ efforts, none of the bills were made into law.85
D. Cellphones and Generation Z: The Complicating Factor of
Sexting Among Minors
After the first child pornography laws were passed at the federal
level, as well as the state level in Maryland, a staggering number of
technological advances have taken place. But perhaps the most dramatic
shift of all has been to the ubiquitous use of cellphones by virtually
every millennial and member of Generation Z.86 According to a 2019
report from the Pew Research Center, smartphone ownership is up by
81% from the first time Pew conducted a smartphone ownership survey
in 2011. 87 The report further noted that smartphone dependency has
grown over time, with 1 in 5 Americans now living as “smartphoneonly” internet users, using their smartphones as their exclusive means
of accessing the internet at home.88 Finally, a 2018 Pew survey measuring teen internet use found that an increasing number of teens use the
internet “on a near-constant basis” with “45% of teens say[ing] they use

83

H.B. 1049, 2019 Leg., 440th Sess. (Md. 2019) (statement of Del. C.T. Wilson),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Committees/Media/false?cmte=jud&ys=2019RS&clip=JUD_3_6_2019_meeting_1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmgahouse.maryland.gov%2Fmga%2Fplay%2F8cf4e781-75364f0c-ba8d-d42731d1efd5%2F%3Fcatalog%2F03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da93ff74bdaa4c%26playfrom%3D4652000.
84
See H.B. 1049, Md. Gen. Assembly, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/HB1049?ys=2019rs (last visited Apr. 17, 2020); see H.B. 931, 2020 Leg., 441st
Sess. (Md. 2020); see H.B. 501, 2020 Leg. 441st Sess. (Md. 2020); see H.B. 1245, 2020 Leg.,
441st Sess. (Md. 2020).
85
See id.
86
See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/; see also Defining Generations:
Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins, Pᴇᴡ Rᴇs. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-zbegins/ (defining “millennial” as the cohort of individuals born between 1981 and 1996 and
“Generation Z” as the cohort of individuals born between 1997 and 2012).
87
Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 86.
88

Id.
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the internet ‘almost constantly, ’a figure that has nearly doubled from
the 24% who said this in the 2014-2015 survey.”89
The exponential increase in cellphone use has had profound implications on the way young Americans communicate, especially Generation Z (“Gen Z”), the cohort of Americans born after 1996 (which
includes S.K., K.S., and A.T.). Gen Z strongly prefers to text rather than
call, and accordingly, use the texting app on their phones as their primary means of communicating with others.90 The constant connection
offered by texting exposes Gen Z to instant gratification, as well as immediate frustration if someone responds ambiguously or there is no response.91 Members of the Gen Z cohort have mixed feelings about texting, with some teens stating that while texting can be an easier mode of
communication for those who are shy, “one issue is that translating tone
of voice through text is difficult (sarcasm, empathy, etc.) . . .. [i]t is impersonal, and people can’t tell or read your emotions.”92
Complicating the already mixed effects of smartphone use
among the Gen Z cohort is the rise of sexting as a type of digital communication. Sexting has increased on a large scale in recent years, and
the practice increases in prevalence as a young person ages.93 Today, 1
in 4 teens have received a sext, and 1 in 7 teens have sent a sext.94 Studies have linked the increasing pervasiveness of sexting to the ubiquitousness of smartphone use, which is underscored by findings that rates
of sexts sent and received via smartphone are much higher than those
sent and received via computer.95 As the rise of sexting is relatively recent, the impact of the practice on youth has just started to be studied in
the past decade.96 However, sexting may lead to emotional distress for
those pressured into sending photos, as well as for those who receive
photos (especially if the recipient did not consent to have the photos sent

89

Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018, Pᴇᴡ Rᴇs.
CTR. (May 31, 2018), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2018/05/PI_2018.05.31_TeensTech_FINAL.pdf.
90
See Daniel Wayne Long, Exploring Generational Differences in Text Messaging
Usage and Habits (Oct. 12, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Nova Southeastern
University) (on file with NSUWorks, College of Engineering and Computing).
91
Id. at 106.
92
Id. at 107–108.
93
Sheri Madigan, et. al, Prevalence of Multiple Forms of Sexting
Behavior Among Youth: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 172 JAMA PEDIATRICS 327,
328 (2018).
94
Id. at 332.
95
96

Id.
See Long, supra note 90.
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to them). 97 Additionally, if sexts are circulated widely throughout a
school, or on the internet, there can be serious mental health repercussions for those involved.98
E. When Technology Outpaces the Law: States Attempt to
Reconcile Child Pornography Legislation with Teen Sexting
One of the most problematic aspects of the rise of sexting among
Gen Z is the inconsistent manner in which different courts respond to
the practice.99 At the federal level, any sexually suggestive image featuring a minor qualifies as child pornography, and the government can
prosecute someone for the production, distribution, and possession of
such images, without any exemptions for minors or sexting.100 However, states vary widely in how they treat sexting within the context of
their child pornography laws: only 20 states specifically address sending
sexts to a minor or receiving sexts from a minor, and those states have
vast differences on whether they consider sexting involving minors to
be a strict liability crime, whether sexting involving minors requires punitive action, whether a resulting conviction should be a violation, misdemeanor, or felony, and how to treat sexts that are being sent and received exclusively by minors.101
The law’s sluggish and incoherent response to the advent of sexting has produced a great deal of harm, especially to minors like S.K.,
who are criminalized for violating child pornography laws, due to their
participation in the increasingly common practice of sexting.102 Slowly,
prosecutors are realizing that minors engaging in sexting should not be
punished under child pornography laws.103 William Fitzpatrick, former
president of the National District Attorneys Association, and the district
97
Megan A. Moreno, What Parents Need to Know About Sexting, 172 JAMA PEDIATRICS 400,
400 (2018).
98
Id.
99
See Haley Zapal, State-by-State Differences in Sexting Laws, BARK BLOG,
https://www.bark.us/blog/state-by-state-differences-in-sexting-laws/ (last updated Aug. 5,
2019).
100
Id.
101
See id.
102
See infra text accompanying notes 104–09.
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attorney of Onondaga County in New York, urged his fellow district
attorneys to be extremely careful when handling teen sexting cases, and
to favor less severe punishments as opposed to criminal charges whenever possible.104 Mr. Fitzpatrick, as well as many legal scholars, have
tried to lobby state legislatures to pass laws that are a better fit for the
current technological landscape.105 While some states have passed laws
in an attempt to remedy this issue, Maryland is not one of them.106
Legal scholars have offered a variety of different solutions in
recent years, including proposing model amendments to child pornography laws that carve out protections for minors who sext other minors
of their own volition, while still prosecuting adults who attempt to obtain explicit material from minors.107 However, other scholars have criticized these amendments as oversimplifying the complexity of sexting,
as the amendments do not address other issues, such as the convergence
of sexting and revenge porn, or when minors upload sexts to websites
that display child pornography. 108 Ultimately, many prosecutors and
scholars have reached the same understanding: adjudicating minors as
delinquent under child pornography laws for sexting each other is harmful in a variety of ways; and more nuanced laws, offering specific remedies tailored to prevent the harm caused by child pornography, revenge
porn, coerced sexting, and receiving non-consensual sexts must be
passed as soon as possible.109
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
The Court of Appeals determined whether the intermediate appellate court erred in finding S.K. to be involved in the offense of distributing child pornography as articulated by CR § 11-207(a)(4) and
whether the court erred in finding S.K. involved in offense of displaying
104
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an obscene item to a minor as outlined by CR § 11-203(b)(1)(ii).110 In a
6-1 decision, the Court held that the text of Maryland’s child pornography statute was unambiguous and contained no exemption for minors,
and thus, S.K. qualified as one who knowingly distributed child pornography under CR § 11-207(a)(4).111 Judge Joseph M. Getty, writing for
the majority, further held that the type of digital media S.K. sent to her
friends—a text-messaged video—qualified as a “film” under the statute
and therefore, S.K.’s conduct fell within the purview of the CR § 11203(b)(1).112
In explaining its holding, the Maryland Court of Appeals highlighted three sources that bolstered their decision: the conclusions other
state courts have reached after adjudicating cases similar to S.K.’s, the
plain language of Maryland’s child pornography laws, and the type of
conduct covered by Maryland’s child pornography laws.113 The Court
began with an overview of State v. Gray,114 a decision out of the Washington Supreme Court where the majority upheld the conviction of a
seventeen-year-old boy for sexting an adult woman.115 The Gray court
declared that the language of Washington statute at issue was unambiguous: “[a] person commits the crime of dealing in depictions of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct in the second degree when he or
she . . . [k]nowingly . . . disseminate[s] . . . any visual or printed matter
that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct
. . .”116
The Gray court declined to make an exception for minors, holding that the scope of the statute was clear. 117 While the Gray court
acknowledged the policy issues surrounding the prosecution of minors
for consensually sexting explicit images, and that there was a breakdown between state law and rapidly changing technological innovations, the court stated:“ our duty is to interpret the law as written and, if
ambiguous, apply its plain meaning to the facts before us.”118 In its discussion of State v. Gray, the Court of Appeals noted that after the Washington Supreme Court decided the case, the Washington Legislature
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subsequently amended the state’s child pornography statute to address
the issues presented by consensual sexting among minors.119
The Court of Appeals also referenced a recent decision out of
the Colorado Supreme Court, People in Interest of T.B.,120 in which the
court upheld the conviction of a minor, who had been sexting two other
minors.121 The male teenager facing charges, T.B., had been arrested on
an unrelated charge for sexual assault, and the arresting officers discovered explicit images on the teenager’s cellphone. 122 The state filed
charges against T.B. on two counts of sexual exploitation of a child under Colorado law, Section 18-6-403(3)(b.5), C.R.S., as well as charges
related to the alleged sexual assault. 123 As the Washington Supreme
Court had decided in State v. Gray, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the plain language of the applicable statute was unambiguous and
declined to create an exception for minors facing charges for violating
the statute, stating that “nothing . . . suggests that such harms are lessened or do not exist merely because the sexually exploitative material is
made, possessed, or distributed by a juvenile rather than an adult.”124
After discussing the outcome of People in Interest of T.B., the Court of
Appeals noted that the Colorado General Assembly had passed a new
law addressing sexting among minors, creating the civil offense of “exchange of a private image by a juvenile”.125 Minor offenders would be
subject to either a $50 fine or mandatory participation in education programs addressing the risks of sexting.126 Following their exploration of
the outcomes of both State v. Gray and People in Interest of T.B., the
Court of Appeals emphasized that the General Assembly had not updated the state’s child pornography statute to address the issues presented by minors engaged in consensual sexting, but acknowledged that
a bill had been introduced in the 2019 legislative session to decriminalize the production or distribution of child pornography by a minor.127
119
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The Court then turned to the plain language of Maryland’s child
pornography laws—specifically, the language of CR § 11-207(a)(4).128
Judge Getty noted that precedent instructed the Court to interpret the
statute’s terminology using “popular understanding of the English language.”129 To determine whether a statute is ambiguous, Judge Getty
stated that precedent further directed the Court to discern whether there
is “more than one reasonable interpretation” or whether “the words are
clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme.”130 Finally, the Court
noted when the majority finds a statute to be ambiguous, the statute’s
meaning and purpose must be examined within the broader context of
legislative intent.131
With the foundation of their statutory analysis established, the
Court delved into the amended child pornography statute, CR § 11207(a)(4)(i), which declares it illegal for a “person” to “knowingly promote, advertise, solicit, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute
any matter, visual representation, or performance . . . that depicts a minor engaged as a subject in sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct
. . .”132 While S.K. argued that the statute contained two areas of ambiguity—that the phrase “a minor engaged as a subject” should be interpreted to preclude minors able to legally consent to sexual conduct, and
that the “person” who is being prosecuted cannot both be the perpetrator
while being “a minor engaged as a subject” at the same time—the Court
disagreed.133 Finding that the Court of Special Appeals ’definition of
the term “subject” aligned with the ordinary usage of the word, the
Court of Appeals rejected S.K.’s contention that the phrase “engaged as
a subject” necessarily meant being subjugated by someone else.134 The
Court of Appeals further found that the term “person” includes both
adults and minors, and therefore, the purview of the child pornography
statute encompassed minors such as S.K.135
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The Court proceeded to bolster its holding by citing the legislative history of the statute.136 Finding that the General Assembly has repeatedly amended the child pornography law to expand the power of the
state in furtherance of its interest in preventing the production and distribution of child pornography, the Court noted that the General Assembly had consistently updated the statute without carving out any exceptions for minors.137 Accordingly, the Court held that the plain meaning
of the statute, as well as the law’s legislative history, supported the conclusion that the statute criminalized the conduct of both minors and
adults.138 Therefore, S.K. was not exempted from being adjudicated as
delinquent under CR § 11-207(a)(4)(i).139
Next, the Court turned to the question of whether S.K.’s conduct
fell within the purview of CR § 11-203(b)(1)(ii), which prohibits the
willing or knowing display of obscene items to a minor.140 Specifically,
the Court discussed whether the contents of S.K.’s sext could be classified as obscene under Maryland law. 141 The Court also addressed
whether S.K.’s text-messaged video, or sext, qualified as the type of obscene “item” contemplated by the statute, which listed still pictures or
photographs, books, pocket books, pamphlets, magazines, videodiscs,
videotapes, video games, films or computer discs, and recorded telephone as prohibited items.142 Ultimately, the Court decided that S.K.’s
video qualified as obscene under the Miller test, as the video featured
images that portrayed minors in a sexualized manner, engaged in sexual
conduct.143
In addition, the Court found that S.K.’s video was indeed an
“item” as contemplated by the child pornography law because the video
qualified as a “film.”144 In explaining their decision, the Court outlined
the intent of the legislature as it pertained to the statute, citing numerous
occasions where the Maryland General Assembly revised the statute to
prevent any potential loopholes for technological advances. 145 The
136
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Court held that the emergence of new technology that allowed for digital
communication did not prevent the statute from applying to those new
mediums through which obscene material is distributed.146 The Court
explained that the concept of “film” has evolved over the years from
film played by movie projectors to videotapes to DVDs to digital files,
now played on a variety of devices.147 As a result, the Court found that
the term “film” was broad enough to include text-messaged videos
played on a smartphone.148 Because “film” was an “item” listed as prohibited by the applicable child pornography statute, and S.K.’s sext was
included within the purview of that statute and therefore violating CR §
11-203(b)(1).149
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Michele D. Hotten argued that
S.K. did not distribute child pornography by sending a sext to her friends
and did not commit the offense of displaying an obscene item to a minor.150 Judge Hotten began her dissent by arguing that it is not the function of CR § 11-207(a)(4) to prosecute sexual activity between consenting minors. 151 Rather, the purpose of the statute is to protect minors
from predators, and therefore, it is illogical for a minor to be their own
predator or their own child pornographer.152 To support her argument,
Judge Hotten delved into the grammar of the statute, finding that the
law’s use of colons would create redundancy if one were to read the law
in a manner that made a “person” and a “minor” the same individual.153
Additionally, Judge Hotten noted that the majority conceded that under
the subsection (a)(1), the same individual cannot be the “minor” and the
“person” at the same time, yet held that under subsections (a)(2)-(a)(5),
no distinction between a “minor” and a “person” was needed.154 Judge
Hotten argued that the majority’s analysis was inconsistent in its application and therefore contrary to canons of statutory construction,
“which dictate that one should avoid interpreting a provision in a manner that is inconsistent with the structure of the statute.”155
146
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Next, Judge Hotten examined the purpose of Maryland’s child
pornography law, citing both Supreme Court case law as well as decisions out of the Court of Appeals.156 After explaining that the purpose
of the child pornography laws at both the federal and state level was to
protect minors from sexual exploitation, Judge Hotten asserted that
S.K.’s actions were completely different from the conduct contemplated
by the child pornography laws.157 Judge Hotten noted that S.K. was allegedly participating in sexual conduct that was consensual in nature, as
opposed to conduct in which she was being hurt or exploited—meaning
that S.K.’s conduct was outside the scope of activity that child pornography laws are intended to prevent.158 She emphasized this point by citing the dissent in State v. Gray, which stated that Washington’s child
pornography statute was “specifically intended to protect children depicted in pornography,” and it was only logical for the children who are
depicted to be exempted from prosecution, as the prosecutorial process
can cause further harm to those children.159
Finally, Judge Hotten disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that S.K.’s text-messaged video qualified as a “film.”160 Instead, Judge
Hotten asserted that the term “film” does not refer to the contents of the
medium, but rather, the medium itself: “a thin, flexible strip of plastic
or other material coated with light-sensitive emulsion for exposure in a
camera, used to produce photographs or motion pictures.”161 Judge Hotten further stated that “if the General Assembly wanted to amend the
language of CR § 11-203 to include digital files, it would have done so,”
and concluded that the majority had erred in their decision to adjudicate
S.K. as delinquent under Maryland law.162
IV. ANALYSIS
In re S.K was incorrectly decided by the Court of Appeals because their holding failed to advance the legislative intent underlying
child pornography legislation at both the state and federal levels.163 In
addition, the Court was overly broad in characterizing a digital file as a
156
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film and stretched the language of the statute beyond the bounds of legal
permissibility to make S.K.’s conduct fit the law’s purview.164 Finally,
the Court had the opportunity to reconcile technological realities with
an antiquated statute but declined to do so, leading to an absurd legal
outcome that failed to promote justice.165
A. The Court Failed to Advance the Legislative Intent Underlying
the Child Pornography Statute
When Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act in 1977, the purpose of the law was clear: to shift
previous efforts focused on combating the dissemination of obscenity in
general towards more targeted legislation to combat the production and
distribution of child pornography.166 The new law was passed with the
goal of both eradicating child pornography, as well as preventing the
recruitment and exploitation of vulnerable youth forced to work as child
prostitutes.167 The Senate Report that accompanied the law noted that
“child pornography and child prostitution have become highly organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale”
and that the “existing Federal laws dealing with prostitution and pornography do not protect against the use of children in these activities….”168 From the outset, it is clear that Congress’s intention behind
the federal child pornography law was to prevent the exploitation of
vulnerable youth through child pornography and child prostitution. As
for Maryland’s child pornography laws, the bill file accompanying the
first state child pornography laws demonstrates that the state statute was
passed to further the same goals of the federal law.169
In contrast, S.K., acting on her own volition, sent a video of herself engaged in consensual sexual activity to her friends.170 S.K.’s actions were not out of the ordinary; she was simply participating in a form
of communication that has become increasingly common among her
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peers.171 Legal scholars have noted that when sexted images are not obtained through coercion, “the immediate psychological, physical, and
emotional harm” to a child “that is the foundation of the child protection
rationale is decidedly absent.”172 Furthermore, it is the production and
distribution of obscene images of minors among adults, not among minors, that fuels exploitative child pornography and child prostitution industries.173 Given that S.K.’s conduct falls beyond the scope of activities the federal and state child pornography statutes were designed to
prevent, the Court erred in deciding that S.K. had violated the state pornography statute.
B. The Court Was Overly Broad in Characterizing a Text
Message Video as a “Film”
Over the years, the General Assembly has amended the state’s
child pornography legislation, attempting to remain in stride with rapidly evolving technology.174 The last time the legislature updated the
statute was in 2006, when “video games” were added to the list of media
covered by CR § 11-203.175 When the Court heard S.K.’s case, the statute included the following media as qualifying “items”: still pictures or
photographs, books, pocket books, pamphlets, magazines, videodiscs,
videotapes, video games, films, computer discs, or recorded telephone
messages.176 While the Court held that the child pornography statute’s
inclusion of “film” makes the law broad enough to encompass a cellphone video as a type of covered media, there is no language within the
statute to support that decision.177 On the contrary, the legislature listed
very specific types of media in the statute, none of which include digital
171
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files, text messages, or cellphone videos.178 Rather than acknowledge
that the plain language of the child pornography law did not encompass
the type of digital media that S.K. sent to her friends, the Court departed
from the statutory language and used an overly broad interpretation of
the word “film” to convict S.K.
In addition to finding no support within the plain language of
CR § 11-203, the Court’s holding is at odds with the recent legislative
history of Maryland’s child pornography laws. After the Court of Special Appeals ’issued their decision regarding S.K.’s case, Delegate
Kathleen M. Dumais introduced House Bill 97 (which was cross-filed
with Senate Bill 1003, sponsored by Senator Susan C. Lee) to revise the
list of “items” in CR § 11-203 to include video files, video images, and
video recordings.179 Delegate Dumais’s bill passed in the House, but
both the House and Senate bill failed to pass in the Senate’s Judicial
Proceeding Committee.180 The General Assembly had the opportunity
to update the statute to reflect the type of media S.K. used when sending
a sext to her friends, but declined to make any amendments in accordance with technological advances. 181 By including cellphone videos
within the purview of CR § 11-203, the Court acted in a legislative capacity, rather than fulfilling the judicial obligation of interpreting existing law.
C. The Court Neglected to Reconcile Technological Realities with
the Antiquated Statute
Throughout the majority opinion in In re S.K., there are acknowledgments of the major disconnect between the technological realities of modern communication and Maryland law. 182 The majority
notes that “[u]nlike the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, Generation
X, or Millennials, Generation Z has never known life without access to
a smartphone” and that is”[c]onsistent with the rise in smartphone usage, at least 18.5% of middle and high schoolers report having received
sexually explicit images or videos on their phones or computers,” concluding that the trend that will likely continue to increase over time.183
The majority further states that “S.K., albeit unwisely, engaged in the
178
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same behavior as many of her peers” and that “there may be compelling
policy reasons for treating teenage sexting different from child pornography.”184 Rather than make a decision that comports with those compelling policy reasons, the Court simply suggests that legislation to address this glaring legal oversight should be passed by the state legislature at some point in the future.185
However, by failing to meaningfully address the technological
realities of cell phone use among minors, the Court missed an opportunity to reconcile modern communication trends with the out-of-date
child pornography law through a First Amendment analysis. The Court
had the chance to use the framework of free speech to examine whether
or not consensual sexting among minors qualifies as child pornography,
yet declined to apply this lens to S.K.’s case. The First Amendment of
the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech.”186 However, over time, the Supreme Court has clarified which content is worthy of First Amendment
protection and which is not—in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire187, the
Supreme Court stated that content or speech that is so lacking in value
that “any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality” is beyond constitutional
protection.188 Child pornography has since been declared unprotected
speech by the Supreme Court.189
But two questions remain - does sexting qualify as child pornography? If not, is sexting worthy of First Amendment protection? There
is certainly a compelling argument that sexting does not comport with
the federal definition of child pornography, as articulated by the Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber.190 In Ferber, the Supreme Court
focused on the harm caused by child pornography in their decision, stating that the production of the obscene material resulted in a “permanent
record” of the abuse, as well as an “economic motive” to continue to
produce the pornography. 191 In the context of sexting—specifically,
when a minor voluntarily sends a sext to another minor, the rationale
184
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behind categorizing the material as unworthy of First Amendment protection falls away.192 There is no sexual abuse taking place, and there is
no economic motive present (unless the minor recipient attempts to sell
the explicit material, which did not occur in S.K.’s case).193 While there
may be emotional and psychological harm when a minor sexts another
minor, this is far from the abuse and economic incentive that results
from the production and dissemination of child pornography.194 As a
result, the constitutional support for outlawing child pornography does
not easily encompass the prosecution of minors for voluntarily sexting
each other.195 In neglecting to examine the technological reality of sexting from a constitutional standpoint, the Court of Appeals failed to reconcile the First Amendment issues presented by equating sexting with
child pornography.196
V. CONCLUSION
In their recent decision, In re S.K., the Maryland Court of Appeals held that S.K., a minor who texted her friends a video in which
she was filmed engaging in a consensual sex act, had violated Maryland
laws prohibiting the distribution of child pornography, as well as the
display of obscene materials to minors.197 The Court incorrectly decided
this case because their holding failed to comport with the legislative intent underlying the Maryland child pornography statute.198 In addition,
the Court’s characterization of S.K.’s text-messaged video as a “film”
in the context of the child pornography statute was overly broad.199 Furthermore, the Court’s analysis neglected to use a constitutional framework to examine the technological realities of cellphone use in the modern world—specifically, the common practice of sexting among Generation Z.200 As a result, S.K. was punished by the very law designed to
protect minors like her, which is a chilling outcome that must not be
mistaken for justice.
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